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year since the season of 1935, and that the users are receiving
water master supervision in the current irrigation season.
Here again. the appellants do not claim that they have been
depriv~d of the use .of any water to which they are justly
entitled.
.
The final decree and the supplemental order, dated April
18, 1940, are and each is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and Moore, J. pro
tem., concurred.
'
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied September
25, 1941.
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CRAS. M. EASTON, Appellant, v. KENNETH K. ASH
et al.,) Respondents.
[1] Limitation of Actioll$-Acknowledgment - Sufficiency - Con·
sideration.-,-A .pre-existing debt, although barred by the statute of limitations, is a sufficient consideration to support &
new acknowledgment of, or promise to pay, the indebtedness;
and is, therefore, ample consideration for a renewal agreement.
[2a, 2b] Mortgages - Performance - Change in Form - Renewal.
The execution of a new note and mortgage after the running
,of the statute of limitations on the original obligation does not
extinguish it, but rather serves to renew it in the absence of
an agreemen~ that the new note shall operate as payment.
[8] Limitation ot Actions-Acknowledgment-Operation and Ef·
fect.-Ifthe ,statute of limitations has run upon an original
indebte.dnesswhen a new agreemtlnt is made, the action is
upon the new promise, ,but the creditor is not required to sue
upo:h' the promise made 'nearest the time of the running of the
statute. If, after the statute has run, the debtor has made
"several acknowledgments of the dept sufficient in law to sus".:,~,tain aI,l, a~tion, the creditor may elect to sue upon anyone of
,them."

'Dig~R~ferences: 1. Limitation of Ac:ions, § 128; 2. Mortgages, § 262;' 3. Limitation of Actions, § 129; 4. Limitation of Actions, § 125; 5. Mortgages, § 403 (3) ;6. Mortgages, § 226; 7. Mortgages, § 420; 8. Agency, § 167; 9. 'Guaranty, § 43; 10. Mortgages,
§ 124; ll. Appeal, § 938.

':' MCK.

~

[4] Id.- Acknowledgment - To Whom Made - Personal Representative.-An acknowledgment of or promise to pay an existing indebtedness may properly be made to the administrator or executor of the payee's estate. And when a renewal
agreement shows that the promise is made to the personal
representative as such, the moral obligation to pay the original debt is sufficient consideration therefor.
[5] Mortgages-Foreclosure-Limitations-Tolling Statute-Sufficiency.-The purpose of Code Civ. Pro c., § 360, is to establish
a rule, not with respect to the character of the promise or
acknowledgment from which a promise may be inferred, but
with reference to the kind of evidence necessary to prove the
promise or acknowledgment. A renewal agreement, executed
with the formalities required by Civ. Code, § 2922, and signed
by the mortgagors through their attorney in fact, which provides that they hereby renew said mortgage and note and
promise and agree to the terms thereof and to the extension
of the same, is a promise to pay the note, sufficient not only to
revive the indebtedness but to renew the original mortgage
as well and this, whether it was executed on the date it bears
or on the date of the acknowledgment thereon.
[6] Id.-Maturity-Extension of Time of Payment-Renewal and
Note and Mortgage as One Transaction.-The fact that a renewal agreement bears the same date of execution as the new
note and· mortgage cannot .operate to bind the three instruments into a single inseparable transaction.
[7] Id.- Foreclosure-Trial-Findings -- Date of Execution.-A
finding that a renewal agreement was executed "as of" a certain date, considered in connection with the evidence and other
findings, was a finding, not that the agreement was executed
on such day, but that it was merely so dated.
[8] Agency - Relation Between Agent and Third Person - Liability of Agent.--A person incurs no liability by reason of the
renewal of a mortgage executed by him as attorney in fact for
the mortgagors where he is acting not in his individual capacity but as agent for them, and his acts are lawful and within
the scope of his authori~y.
[9] Guaranty-Actions Against Guarantor-Time to Sue-Tolling
Statute.-Acts by a principal obligor cannot toll the statute
of limitations as to his guarantor in the absence of a provision
in the contract of guaranty to that effect.
4. To whom must acknowledgment, new promise or payment be
made in order to toll statute of limitations after creditor's death,
note, 117 A. L. R. 224. See, also, 16 Cal. Jur. 594; 34 Am. Jur. 255.
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[10] Mortgages-Rights, Duties and Liabilities-Injury to Property.-A mortgagee is entitled to recover damages from the
mortgagor and third persons for cutting trees on the premises when these acts render the mortgage insufficient security
for the debt.
[11] Appeal-Dismissal-Effect of Determination.-An order denying a motion to dismiss an appeal must be deemed a final
determination of the timeliness of filing notice of appeal.

Chas. M. Easton, in pro. per., and Ray Howard for Appellant.
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"RENEWAL AND EXTENSION OF NOTE AND
MORTGAGE
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That
whereas,heretofore, to-wit: on the 28th day of June, 1924,
a certain mortgage was executed by Kenneth K. Ash and Ada
Gertrude Ash, husband and wife, by and through their Attorney-in-fact, Margaret Cross, a single woman, mortgagors,
. to Henry Hileman, mortgagee, securing a note of even [date
therewith in the sum of $1000.00, which mortgage is now of
record in the office of the County Recorder of Riverside
County, California, in Book 237, Page 430 of mortgages of said
. County; and WHEREAS, said note and mortgage has hereto. fore been extended by the holder thereof, and WHEREAS,
Henry Hileman is now deceased and Rena Hileman was appointed executrix of his estate in and by the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, California, said probate proceedings
being numbered 112775, and WHEREAS, said Rena Hileman,
the widow of said deceased is the duly appointed, qualified
and acting executrix of said estate, and WHEREAS, it is
mutually desired by all parties thereto and hereto that said
note and mortgage be renewed and extended and that the
terms and conditions of said mortgage remain the same and
that it is mutually understood and agreed that such renewal
and extension is for the best interests of said estate and parties hereto.

n

Action to foreclose mortgage and for damages for cutting
down trees on the mortgaged premises. Judgment against
foreclosure reversed with directions; judgments of nonsuit on
cause of action for dam~ges reversed.

TRAYNOR, J.-On June 28,1924, defendants Ash, acting
through defendant Cross, to whom they had given a power of
attorney, executed a note for $1000 payable six months after
date and a mortgage upon certain real property in Riverside
County to Henry Hileman. Defendant Cross subsequently
agreed to pay all th~ interest due or to become due on the
mortgage and note. The interest was paid to June 29, 1930.
In 1930 Henry Hileman died and his widow Rena was appointed executrix of his estate. On December 10, 1930, defendailts Ash, acting through defendant Cross, executed a
llQte and mortgage in favor of Rena Hileman for the sum of
$1000 payable in monthly installments. This m'Jrtgage was
never recorded because plaintiff had instructed the title company, to whom the mortgage and a release of the first mortgage had been delivered, not to record it until it would appear
as a first lien upon the property.
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Defendants Ash, through defendant Cross, also entered into
. the following written agreement with Rena Hileman" as of"
December 10, 1930:

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Riverside County. R. A. Moore, Judge pro tem. Judgment for
one defendant reversed with directions; judgments for
remaining defendants reversed.

Meserve, Mumper, Hughes & Robertson, Meserve, Mumper
& Hughes, Leo E. Anderson and James A. Hall for Respondents.

c.

"NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of one dollar in
hand paid by the mortgagors to the mortgagee and holder of
said mortgage and note, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the said Rena Hileman hereby renews and extends the said mortgage and note and the maturity thereof
for a period of forty (40) months from and after February
1st, 1931, and the said mortgagors hereby renew said mortgage and note and promise and agree to the terms thereof
and the extension of the same and undertake and bind their.
heirs and assigns to the further condition that said mortgage
shall be and remain a first and prior lien on and against said
property.

'ifnr. 1054; 19 R. C. L. 326.
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"WITNESS the hands of the mortgagee and mortgagors,
by and through their attorney-in-fact Margaret Cross, this
10th day of December, 1930.
KENNETH K. ASH,
ADA GERTRUDE ASH,

Mortgagors.
By MARGARET CROSS,
Their Attorney-in-Fact.
RENA HILEMAN,

,Mortgagee."
An' acknowledgment dated August 9, 1934, appears at the
, end of this agreement.
On April 7, 1936, the note and mortgage of 1924, the note
and, mortgage of December 10, 1930, and the renewal agreement set forth above were distributed to Rena Hileman and
she 'thereafter ,assigned them to the plaintiff, the present
owner and holder. ,No pa~t of, the principal sum of either of
,the notes has been paid, and plaintiff brought this action ask,ing •for foreclosure of, the original mortgage based on the last
'rell;ewal agreement, and for damages' against defendants
;GeorgeF.Scott and Warren L. Holbrook as well as defend- ~
;~nts Ash' and'; defendant Cross for allegedly cutting down
'eucalyptus t;rees growing upon the land.
. "The trial court found that the renewal agreement was without consideration and of no force and effect, that the 1924
note and defendant Cross's guaranty were barred by the provisions of suhdivision one of section 337 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, that the 1930 note was cancelled by waiver in open
court, and that the liens of both mortgages were extinguished.
,Judgment was given in favor of the Ashes and a nonsuit was
granted in favor of defendants Scott, Holbrook and Cross.
Plaintiff, has appealed.
[1] The finding of the trial court that the renewal agreem~nt was, without consideration is not supported by the evi'dence nor is it a correct conclusion of law. The agreement
recites that it was the wish of the parties to renew and extend
the mortgage and note of June, 1924, and that the mortgagors
"renew said mortgage and note" and "promise and agree to
the terms thereof and the extension of the same." It is well
settled in California that a pre-existing debt, although barred
by the statute of limitations, is sufficient consideration to support a ne,w, acknQwledgment of or promise to pay the indebt-
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edness (Ooncannon v. Smith, 134 Cal. 14 [66 Pac. 40] ; Ferguson v. Fonner, 87 Cal. App. 590 [262 Pac. 337]. See Estate
of McOonnell, 6 Cal. (2d) 493 [58 Pac. (2d) 639]), or the
execution of a deed (Ferguson v. Larson, 139 Cal. App. 133
[33 Pac. (2d) 1061]. See Ohicheste.r v. Mason, 43 Cal. App.
(2d) 577 [111 Pac. (2d) 362]), 'or mortgage. (Foster v.
lVarren, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 470 [103 Pac. (2d) 591].) The
original indebtedness was therefore ample consideration for
the execution' of the renewal agreement.
,[2a] The original indebtedness was not extinguished by
the execution of the note and mortgage of December 10, 1930.
At the time the 1930 note and mortgage were executed, the
statute of limitations had run upon the original note and
mortgage. When the new note and mortgage were executed
it is undisputed that the parties intended them as a renewal
of the original obligation and lien. It has been held in this
state that the acceptance by a mortgagee of a new note and
niortgage as a renewal of or substitution for an existing note
and mortgage does not itself operate to extinguish or discharge the original obligation. (White v. Stevenson, 144 Cal.
104 [77 Pac. 828] ; Pacific Nat. Agr. Oredit Oorp. v. Wilbur,
2 Cal. (2d) 576 [42 Pac. (2d) 314] ; Tolman v. Smith, 85 Cal.
280 [24 Pac. 743] ; Palmer v. Emanuel, 77 Cal. App. 766 [247
Pac. 609]. See Newman v. Nickell, 50 Cal. App. 138, 140
[194 Pac. 710] ; Oollege Nat. Bank v. Morrison, 100 Cal. App.
403, 407 [280 Pac. 218].) "One executory agreement is not
extinguished by the execution of another between the same
parties; nor is a security for an obligation merged in another
security of the same degree which is accepted for the same
obligation. It is a well-settled rule that, in the absence of an
agreement to that' effect, a promissory note is not paid by the
execution of another note, but that the time for its payment is
thereby merely suspended until the maturity of the new note. "
(White v. Stevenson, supra, at page 108. See also Oopp v.
Millen, 11 Cal. (2d) 122 [77 Pac. (2d) 1093].)
[3] This principle is not affected by the running of the
statute of limitations upon the original indebtedness. If the
statute has run when the new agreement is made, the action
is upon the new promise, but the creditor is not required to
sue upon the promise made nearest to the time of the running
of the statute. If, after the statute has run, the debtor has
made several acknowledgments of the debt sufficient in law
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to sustain an action, the creditor may elect to sue upon any
of them. Suit upon an acknowledgment is not precluded by
the existence of earlier acknowledgments or promises.
[2b] In the present case, the 1930 note was an executory
agreement taken by the plaintiff's assignor in renewal of a
pre-existing and unperformed executory agreement. There
is no evidence, nor do defendants contend, that the 1930 note
was intended by either of the parties as payment of the debt.
In the absence of such an agreement, the 1930 note ap.d mortgage served to renew the original note and mortgage, not to
extinguish them.
[4] Defendants contend that the moral obligation to pay
the original debt was, not consideration in the instant case because the 1930 note and mortgage and the renewal agreement
were not made in favor of the estate of Henry Hileman, the
owner of the 1924 note and mortgage, but in favor of Rena
Hileman, who, it is contended, owned no claim against the
defendants. Th,e renewal agreement upon which plaintiff
bases his right to recover, however, refers to Rena Hileman as
the duly appointed, qualified and acting executrix of the
estate of Henry Hileman. An acknowledgment of or promise :.,
to pay an existing indebtedness may properly be made to, the
administrator or executor of the payee's estate. (Farrell v.
Palmer, 36 Cal. 187. See cases cited in 117 A. L. R. 228.
See also Wilcox v. Gregory, 135 Cal. 217 [67 Pac. 139] ; Moore
v. Gould, 151 Cal. 723 [91 Pac. 616] ; Altube v. Aguirre, 59
Cal. App. 762, 766 [212 Pac. 217].) The language of the
renewal agreement shows that the promise of defendants was
made to Rena Hileman in her capacity as executrix of the
estate of HEmry Hileman.
[5] Defendants contend further that the renewal agreement was not a sufficient acknowledgment of or promise to pay
the debt to remove the bar of the statute of limitations. No
particular form for such an acknowledgment or promise is
prescribed. (Searles v. Gonzalez, 191 Cal. 426 [216 Pac. 1003,
28 A. L. R. 78].) Section 360 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires only thatthe acknowledgment or promise be in
a writing signed by the party to be charged. Its purpose is
'to establish· a rule, not' with respect to the ch;:.tracter of the
promise or acknowledgment from which a promise may be
inferred, but with respect to the kind of evidence necessary
to prove the promise or acknowledgment. (Shirley v. ShirZey, 83 Cal. App. 386 [256 Pac. 823] ; Lehman v.Newcomer,
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118 Cal. App. 145 [4 Pac. (2d) 994].) In the instant case
the renewal agreement, signed by defendants Ash through
their attorney in fact, provides that the said mortgagors
"hereby renew said mortgage and note and promise and
agree to the terms thereof and the extension of the same."
Here is a clear promise to pay the note.
The renewal agreement was sufficient not only to revive
the indebtedness but to renew the original mortgage as well.
Although a new promise to pay a debt made after the statute
has run does not itself revive a mortgage barred by the running of the statute on the original debt (Weinberger v.
Weidman, 134 Cal. 599 [66 Pac. 869] ; Sanford v. Bergin, 156
Cal. 43 [103 Pac. 333] ; Kern Valley Bank v. Koehn, 157 Cal.
237 [107 Pac. 111] ; Fontana Land 00. v. Laughlin, 199 Cal.
625 [250 Pac. 669, 48 A. L. R. 1308]), the mortgage may be
renewed by a compliance with the provisions of section 2922
of the Civil Code which provides that: "A mortgage can be
created, renewed or extended, only by writing, executed with
the formalities required in the case of a grant of real property." (See Southern Pacific 00. v. Prosser, 122 Cal. 413
[52 Pac. 836, 55 Pac. 145] ; Oonway v. Supreme Oouncil O. K.
of ..4.., 137 Cal. 384, 389 [70 Pac. 223]; Sanford v. Bergin,
supra.) The renewal agreement in the present case was exeeuted with the formalities required by section 2922 and contains an acknowledgment of the 1924 mortgage and debt sufficient to renew both and to start a new period of limitation.
(See Moore v. Gould, supra.)
This new period' of limitation began on the new maturity
date set forth in the renewal agreement, namely forty months
from and after February 1st, 1931, or June 1st, 1934.
(Steiner v. Davis, 24 Cal. App. (2d) 692, 695 [76 Pac. (2d)
157].) An ac'tion thereon could thus not be barred before
June 1, 1938. The complaint was filed in May, 1937, well,
within the statutory period, and it is immaterial whether the
renewal agreement was executed on the date it bears, Decem.
ber 10, 1930, or on the date of the acknowledgment thereon,
August 9, 1934.
.
[6] It is also immaterial whether or 'not plaintiff waived
his right to recover under the 1930 note and mortgage. The
action was brought upon the 1924 note and mortgage and the
agreement specifically renewing them, and those instruments
constituted a sufficient cause of action in themselves. The
fact that the renewal agreement bears the same date of execu-
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tion as the new note and mortgage cannot operate to bind
the three instruments into a single inseparable transaction.
[7] The trial court did not find that the renewal agreement
was, executed on December 10, 1930, but that it was executp,d
It as of" that date.
Taken with the evidence that it was actually executed,in 1934 on the date of its acknowledgment, and
th.e finding of the court that "said renewal agreement was
intended and it was the agreement of the parties thereto that
it did not and would not change the' provisions of said note
and mortgage of 1930," the finding of the court was not that
it was executed on December 10, 1930, but that it was merely
':sodated. The plaintiff evidently believed that a subsequent
'renewal in the form of:the renewal agreement would operate
'to preserve the original lien of the first mortgage and give it
priority over any ,intervening lien upon the property.
[8] Defendant Cross incurred no liability by reason of the
renewals executed by her as attorney in fact for the defendants Ash since she was acting not in her individual capacity
Qut .as agent 'for them and her acts were lawful and within
the 'scope of her authority. (Moore v. Gould, supra.) [9]
The statute, oflim,itations had run against her agreement to
pay the interest on 'the mortgage and there was no showing
that this agreement was renewed. Acts by a principal obligor
cannot toll the statute as to his guarantor in the absence of
a provision in the contract of guaranty to that effect. (Purdy
v. Maree,31 Cal. App. (2d) 125 [87 Pac. (2d) 390].)
[10] Plaintiff also appeals from judgments of nonsuit in
favor of defendants Scott, Holbrook and Cross. Upon a motion for nonsuit the court must assume that all the evidence
favorable to the plaintiff is true and must construe all presumptions, inferences, and doubtful questions in a manner
most favorable to the plaintiff. (Richardes v. Richardes, 211
Cal. 392 [295 Pac. 816] ; Babe v. Western Union Tel. Co., 198
Cal. 290 [244 Pac. 1077] ; Henley v. Bursell, 61 Cal. App.
511 [215 Pac. 114].) Conflicting or contradictory evidence
must be disregarded. (Rabe v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
supraj Henley v. Bursell, supraj Marchetti v. Southern Pacific 00., 204 Cal. 679 [269 Pac. 529].) If there, is evidence
to sustain the plaintiff's action, or if the evidence is conflicting, a nonsuit should be denied. In the light of these rules,
it is apparent that the granting of a nonsuit as to these defendants was error. The plaintiff testified that he objected
to the cutting of trees on the land and insisted that such

~
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action be stopped. There was also testimony by a licensed
real estate broker that the land was not worth over $200,
that when it is covered by a stand of timber the trees constitute its principal value,that there is no firewood value to the
trees now standing on the property, and that the value of the
land was the same in 1934 as in 1937.
A mortgagee has a right of action for damages against his
mortgagor and third persons who have cut and removed timber from the mortgaged land when these acts have rendered
the mortgage insufficient se~urity for the debt. (Robinson v.
Russell, 24 Cal. 467, 473; Buclwut v. Swift, 27 Cal. 433 [87
Am. Dec. 90] ; Lavenson v. Standard Soap 00., 80 Cal. 245
[22 Pac. 184, 13 Am. St. Rep. 147] ; Van Pelt v. ..McGraw, 4
N. Y. 110. See cases cited in 19 Ruling Case Law, 326.) The
principal amount of the debt owed to the plaintiff was $1000,
,and since the value of the land lay chiefly in its timber, it is
clear that the cutting of the trees materially impaired the
value of the security. There is no evidence that the executrix,
Rena Hileman, the owner of the mortgage at the time of the
cutting, had any personal knowledge of or ever assented to
the cutting of the trees.
[11] The contention of defendants Scott, Holbrook and
Cross that the notice of appeal was filed too late was settled
by the orders of this court on December 5, 1939, and January
16, 1940, denying the motions of these defendants to dismiss
the appeal as to them. These rulings must be deemed final.
(Edwards v. Brockway, 16 Cal. App. 626, 631 [117 Pac. 787].
See White v. Fresno Nat. Bank, 98 Cal. 166, 167 [32 Pac. 979 J.)
The judgment in favor of defendants Ash is reversed with
instructions to enter judgment for the foreclosure of the
mortgage upon the property. The judgments of nonsuit as
to defendants Scott, Holbrook and Cross are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J.,
and Pullen J., pro tem., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied September 25, 194L

